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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In an earlier criminal proceeding, Juan Gonzales pled guilty to a single count of
lewd conduct with a minor. In that case, Mr. Gonzales' counsel never sought to obtain
an independent (confidential) psychosexual evaluation for Mr. Gonzales, and he never
advised Mr. Gonzales to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to silence and not
participate in the court-ordered (unprivileged) evaluation. Consequently, Mr. Gonzales
participated in the court-ordered evaluation, revealing a significant amount of highly
prejudicial information.

Based largely on this unfavorable evaluation, Mr. Gonzales

received a prison sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
Subsequently, Mr. Gonzales initiated the present case by filing a petition for postconviction relief and filing a motion seeking the appointment of post-conviction counsel.
In his petition, Mr. Gonzales alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel insofar as his attorney failed to obtain an independent (confidential)
psychosexual evaluation or advise him not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation.
However, the district court denied Mr. Gonzales' motion for appointment of counsel and
summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief.
On appeal, Mr. Gonzales asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion and dismissing his petition because, in fact, he presented prima facie evidence
of ineffective assistance of counselor, at the very least, the possibility of a valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

He asks that this Court vacate the district court's

dismissal order and remand his case for an evidentiary hearing or, at a minimum, the
appointment of post-conviction counsel.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 27, 2007, Juan Gonzales was charged with two counts of lewd
conduct and one count of rape based on allegations that he had sexual contact with his
teenage daughter. (No. 35211 R., ppA-5.) Following a preliminary hearing, he was
bound over on both counts of lewd conduct, as well as a reduced charged of attempted
rape. (R., pp.30, 31-32.)
Approximately four months after he was originally charged (on or about
January 4, 2008), Mr. Gonzales entered into a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to
a single count of lewd conduct with a minor, for manual-to-genital contact, and, in
exchange, the other two charges were dismissed. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.3, L.17 - pA,
L.8, p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.15, p.13, L.19 - p.14, L.5.) Upon accepting Mr. Gonzales' plea,
the district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report, as well as a psychosexual
evaluation; however, it also advised Mr. Gonzales of his right, based on the Fifth
Amendment, not to participate in either. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.i0, L.16 - p.11, L.8,
p.14, L.11-p.16, L.5; No. 35211 R., ppA0-41.) In response to the district court's order,
Mr. Gonzales' counsel requested that the psychosexual evaluation be ordered to be
performed by a Dr. Dodgen; however, the district court ordered that a Dr. Smith conduct
the evaluation instead. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.16, L.5.)
Mr. Gonzales' counsel never sought out a private psychosexual evaluationwhether through Dr. Dodgen or some other provider. 1 (No. 36625 R., p.8.) Nor did

1 Although the record does not disclose why retained counsel never sought out a private
psychosexual evaluation for his client, the failure in this regard appears not to have
been based on a lack of funding, as counsel was privately retained (No. 35211
R., pp.13-14) and Mr. Gonzales ended up paying for the court-ordered evaluation (No.
36625 R., pA4).
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counsel ever advise Mr. Gonzales to invoke his right to silence in the court-ordered
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith.

(No. 36625 R., p.8.) Thus, Mr. Gonzales

participated in the evaluation with Dr. Smith, as well as a related polygraph examination
with Chip Morgan. (See generally Psychosexual Evaluation Report (hereinafter, PSE);
Polygraph Reportl
During the polygraph examination and his interview with Dr. Smith, Mr. Gonzales
ultimately disclosed that he had sexual contact with his daughter on numerous
occasions, and, further, that this contact included more than the mere manual-to-genital
contact that he had admitted in pleading guilty. (PSE, pp.2, 3; Polygraph Report, p.2.)
Specifically, Mr. Gonzales admitted to "many" instances of sexual contact, described
two instances of completed vaginal intercourse and five additional instances of
attempted vaginal intercourse, and disclosed one instance of completed oral sex and
one instance of attempted oral sex.

(Polygraph Report, p.2.)

He also admitted to

sexual intercourse with two other underage victims (ages sixteen to seventeen years
old) as an adult (age 32). (Polygraph Report, p.2.) Even then the polygrapher opined
that Mr. Gonzales had been deceptive (leading to the inference that there are still
undisclosed victims or aggravating circumstances about Mr. Gonzales' criminal sexual
past). (Polygraph Report, pp.4-5.) Thus, Dr. Smith characterized Mr. Gonzales as a
hebephile. (PSE, pp.9, 11.) In addition, in light of Mr. Gonzales' attempts to conceal
and minimize his sexual misconduct, the known scope of that misconduct, his alcohol
problems, and his apparent lack of empathy for his daughter, Dr. Smith opined that

The PSE is included in the Clerk's Record in Case No. 35211 as a sealed exhibit. The
Polygraph Report is attached to the PSE.
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Mr. Gonzales presents a moderate risk of re-offense. (PSE, pp.8-9, 10. Compare PSE,
p.2 (Mr. Gonzales minimizing the number of incidents with his daughter) and p.3
(Mr. Gonzales minimizing the type of contact with his daughter) and p.5 (Mr. Gonzales
claiming that none of sexual partners were underage), with Polygraph Report, p.2
(revealing significantly more sexual misconduct) and Polygraph Report, ppA-5
(revealing apparent deception in even the more expansive sexual history provided to
the polygrapher).)
Dr. Smith then forwarded his report directly to the prosecution (as well as the
district court). (See PSE, p.1; No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.3, L.24 - pA, L.2.) Thus, his
conclusions were then picked up on by the pre-sentence investigator and repeatedly
highlighted in the pre-sentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). (PSI, pp.1 0-11,
13-14.)
Mr. Gonzales was sentenced on March 3, 2008. (See generally No. 35211 Sent.
Tr.) At that hearing, the district court undoubtedly relied upon Dr. Smith's damning
report.

(No, 36625 R., pA7 ("The court did rely on the evaluation conducted by

Dr. Smith .... "); see, e.g., No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, LS.7-9 ("The court has reviewed in
detail the presentence investigation report, as well as the psychosexual evaluation
conducted by Dr. Smith."), p.16, LS.20-21 ("The court has focused a great deal on what
Dr. Smith's recommendations are."), p.17, Ls.1-3 ("In cases of this type, given the
recommendation by Dr. Smith, the court does not believe that the rider program is
appropriate.").)

In fact, the PSE appears to have been the single biggest factor

underlying the sentence ultimately imposed (and ordered into execution) by the district
court (twenty years, with five years fixed):
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The court has focused a great deal on what Dr. Smith's
recommendations are, Dr. Smith does note that you are a moderate risk
to reoffend, Dr. Smith does note that at the present time you are not a
candidate for outpatient treatment and that you're a candidate for
residential treatment.
In cases of this type, given that recommendation by Dr. Smith, the
court does not believe that the rider program is appropriate, As we all
know and this court has been told many times by the Department of
Corrections, the rider program is not a treatment program for sex
offenders, It is merely an assessment to further evaluate whether the
defendant is an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment.
Dr. Smith has done a complete and thorough examination, The
court is concerned over the fact that, Mr. Gonzales, you were deceptive in
your polygraph, It's clear that when you were interviewed for the PSI,
when you were initially interviewed by Dr. Smith for purposes of his
evaluation, that you were minimizing the nature and extent of your
behavior with your daughter, and it wasn't until the polygraph that the truth
really came out. And I think, in part, that's why Dr. Smith believes that
you're not an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment at this time,
So, for those reasons, the court does not believe that you're an
appropriate candidate for probation presently, the court does not believe
that you're an appropriate candidate for the rider. Therefore, as to the
charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen, a
felony, the court will impose court costs of $297,50, The court is not going
to impose any fine,
The court, however, is going to impose penitentiary time of twenty
years, with five years fixed, fifteen years indeterminate, not to exceed
twenty, , , ,
, , , For the reasons previously stated by the court, [neither] the
retained jurisdiction [program] nor probation is appropriate,
(No, 35211 Sent. Tr., p,16, L,20 - p, 18, L10,)
Mr. Gonzales timely appealed, (No, 35211 R" pp,59-61,) On appeal, he argued
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence;
however, in a per curiam opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Gonzales'
sentence, State v, Gonzales, No, 35211,2009 Unpublished Opinion No, 318 (Ct. App,
Jan, 12,2009), A remittitur was issued on March 31, 2009,

5

On April 15, 2009, Mr. Gonzales, acting pro se, filed a verified petition for postconviction relief and a supporting affidavit. (No. 36625 R., pp.2-9.) Together, these
documents alleged that Mr. Gonzales had received ineffective assistance of counsel in
his criminal case insofar as his attorney failed to obtain a private psychosexual
evaluation from Dr. Dodgen (which would have remained privileged unless or until the
defense decided to disclose it) and failed to counsel him not to participate in the
unprivileged evaluation with Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R., ppA, 7-8.) Mr. Gonzales, thus,
sought an order reopening his criminal case, sealing the existing psychosexual
evaluation report in that case, and remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing
(wherein Mr. Gonzales might have an opportunity to present a psychosexual evaluation
report from an independent expert, such as Dr. Dodgen) before a different district
judge 3 (See No. 36625 R., ppA, 8.)
Along with his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Gonzales also filed a motion
for appointment of counsel. (See Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of
Counsel (Conflict Free) (Apr. 15,2009); see also Motion and affidavit for Permission to

Although Mr. Gonzales' verified petition and affidavit spoke specifically of Dr. Dodgen
(as opposed to a privately-retained expert more generally), reading those filings
liberally, as the district court should have done, and as this Court must do, cf. Plant v.
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]hen a motion for the
appointment of counsel is presented, every inference is to be drawn in the petitioner's
favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know
how to properly allege the necessary facts); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 37, 415 P.2d
679, 680 (1966) (holding that a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be liberally
construed, especially where it is prepared by a prisoner who is untrained in the law), it is
clear that Mr. Gonzales' claim has less to do with anything that Dr. Dodgen might have
said, and much more to do with the fact that Dr. Dodgen would have been a privatelyretained defense expert and, thus, anything he said would have been privileged. (See
No. 36625 R., p.8 ("Counsel should have just had me evaluated by Dr. Dodgen, where
the results of the evaluation would have been privileged unless favorable and, therefore,
voluntarily disclosed by me and Counsel .... ").)
3
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Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees (Prisoner) (Apr. 15, 2009) (providing
additional support for Mr. Gonzales' claim of indigency).)4
The district court did not hesitate to issue a lengthy notice of its intent to deny
Mr. Gonzales' motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition for
post-conviction relief in its entirety.5 (No. 36625 R., pp.10-22.) In its notice, the district
court construed Mr. Gonzales' petition as presenting three distinct claims for relief:
The petitioner asserts that his counsel's ineffectiveness is based on
the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149
P.3d 833 (2007), and his claims can be summarized as follows:
(1)
His attorney did not advise against participating in the
presentence investigation inteNiew;
(2)
His attorney did not advised [sic] against participating in the
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith; and
(3)

His attorney failed to have him evaluated by Dr. Dodgen.

(No. 36625 R., p.16.) It then went on to say that the first claim (concerning the presentence investigation inteNiew) was frivolous because neither the Fifth nor the Sixth
Amendment has any application in pre-sentence investigation inteNiews and, besides,
Mr. Gonzales had been apprised of his right to silence at his change of plea hearing
anyway.6 (No. 36625 R., pp.3, 16-17.) The district court then stated that the second

4 Both the motion for appointment of counsel, and the motion for permission to proceed
on partial payment of fees, are attached to Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Augment Record,
which is filed contemporaneously herewith.
5 That notice was filed on April 20, 2009, five days after Mr. Gonzales' verified petition
was filed. (See No. 36625 R., p.10.)
6 The district court cited Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007),
for the proposition that the neither the Fifth Amendment right to silence, nor the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, has any application in a pre-sentence investigation
inteNiew. (No. 36625 R., pp.16-17.) While the district court's citation to Stuart was
appropriate for its contention regarding the Sixth Amendment, Stuart does not support
the district court's claim that the Fifth Amendment right to silence has no application in a
pre-sentence investigation inteNiew. See generally Stuart, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d
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claim (concerning Dr. Smith's psychosexual evaluation) was frivolous because the only
relevant inquiry is whether Mr. Gonzales was advised of the existence of his right to
silence (as opposed to being counseled as to whether he should invoke or, instead,
waive that right), and the transcript of Mr. Gonzales' change of plea hearing
unequivocally showed that he was so advised (by the district court).
R., pp.13, 17-19.)

(No. 36625

Finally, with regard to the third claim (concerning the lack of an

evaluation by Dr. Dodgen), the district court observed that Mr. Gonzales could not
demonstrate that Dr. Smith's evaluation was flawed such that it could have been
rebutted, or that Dr. Dodgen's evaluation (had he conducted one) would have been
favorable, and it ruled that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is frivolous until
such a showing is made, and, besides, the district court reasoned, Mr. Gonzales failed
to show that the failure to contract with Dr. Dodgen was not a strategic decision on the
partofcounsel. (No. 36625 R., pp.13, 19-21.)
On April 30, 2009, Mr. Gonzales filed a response to the district court's notice (No.
36625 R., pp.26-27), as well as a second affidavit, which included a 2008 letter from the
attorney who had handled Mr. Gonzales' direct appeal 7 (No. 36625 R., pp.29-33). The
letter from appellate counsel is notable because, as a letter alerting Mr. Gonzales to a
possible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and explaining that claim, it should
have put Mr. Gonzales' original petition and affidavit in context.

(See No. 36625

R., pp. 32-33.) It also should have made it exceptionally clear to the district court that

506. In fact, the Stuart Court specifically declined to address this very issue. Id. at 469
n.1, 180 P.3d at 508 n.1. Furthermore, although it is not relevant to any claims raised in
this appeal (see note 8, infra), Mr. Gonzales contends that, unless the right is waived, or
unless immunity is granted, he always has a Fifth Amendment right to silence.
7 That appellate attorney in question was undersigned counsel, Erik Lehtinen.
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Mr. Gonzales' claim was that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in his
criminal case insofar as his attorney failed to obtain a private psychosexual evaluation
from Dr. Dodgen (which would have remained privileged unless or until the defense
decided to disclose it) and failed to counsel him not to participate in the unprivileged
evaluation with Dr. Smith. (See No. 36625 R., pp.32-33.) Specifically, the letter from
appellate counsel stated as follows:
My concern is that Mr. Brown [defense counsel] may have rendered
deficient performance by failing to advise you not to participate in the
presentence investigation or the evaluation with Dr. Smith. He could have
simply had you evaluated by Dr. Dodgen, where the results of the
evaluation would have been privileged unless favorable and, therefore,
voluntarily disclosed by you and Mr. Brown. I simply cannot see any
strategic value to him advising you to waive your rights and disclose a lot
of potentially harmful information in a non-privileged setting to Dr. Smith.
This seems to have been a tremendous and unnecessary risk, and one
that ended up hurting you in the end.
(No. 36625 R., pp.32-33.)
Again, the district court responded promptly. On May 11, 2009, the district court
entered a 15-page order dismissing Mr. Gonzales' petition and formally denying his
motion for appointment of counsel. (No. 36625 R., pp.34-48.) In this order, the district
court continued to characterize Mr. Gonzales' petition as presenting the following three
claims for relief:

(1) his attorney did not advise him against participating in the

presentence investigation interview; (2) his attorney did not advise him against
participating in the psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith; and (3) his attorney failed to
have him evaluated by Dr. Dodgen. (See, e.g., No. 36625 R., p.35.) It then analyzed
each claim in turn, describing them all as frivolous.
With regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' first claim
(concerning the pre-sentence investigation interview), the district court concluded that

9

that claim was frivolous because "the right to remain silent does not apply to the
presentence investigation interview," and because the pre-sentence investigation
interview was not a critical stage of the proceeding where Mr. Gonzales would have
been entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 41.)
With regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' second
claim (concerning participation in Dr. Smith's psychosexual evaluation), the district court
concluded that that claim was frivolous because: Mr. Gonzales had been informed of
his right to silence by the district court; counsel could not have known that Dr. Smith's
evaluation would be unfavorable (or favorable, for that matter) so Mr. Gonzales' claim
must necessarily be the product of hindsight; the failure to advise Mr. Gonzales to
exercise his right to silence must be presumed to have been a tactical decision on the
part of counsel, and Mr. Gonzales cannot disprove that possibility; and the district court
would have treated the absence of a psychosexual report in the same manner as a
highly unfavorable report, such that it would have imposed a prison sentence even
without the damning report from Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 41-44, 47.)
Finally, with regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' third
claim (concerning the failure to obtain an evaluation from Dr. Dodgen), the district court
concluded that that claim was frivolous because Mr. Gonzales failed to identify any
flaws in Dr. Smith evaluation or say what sort of favorable statements Dr. Dodgen might
have made and, besides, Mr. Gonzales failed to disprove the district court's
presumption that Mr. Gonzales' counsel had a strategic or tactical reason for failing to
obtain an independent psychosexual evaluation. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 44-45, 46, 47.)
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On June 5, 2009, Mr. Gonzales, still acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal,
thereby initiating the present appeal.

(No. 36625 R., pp.50-52.)

On appeal,

Mr. Gonzales contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition
and in denying his motion for appointment of counsel.

Specifically, Mr. Gonzales

asserts that, not only has he raised the possibility of a valid claim such that counsel
should have been appointed to assist him, but he has presented prima facie evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel such that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims.

11

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Gonzales' petition for postconviction relief?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Gonzales' motion for appointment of postconviction counsel?

12

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Gonzales' Petition For PostConviction Relief Because The Petition Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Gonzales presented two closely

connected claims for relief: (1) his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to seek out a private (privileged) psychosexual evaluation; and (2) his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him not to participate in
the court-ordered (unprivileged) psychosexual evaluation a The district court, however,
summarily dismissed both claims.

For the reasons set forth in detail below,

Mr. Gonzales contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims,
as he has presented prima facie evidence of ineffectiveness with regard to both claims.
B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process

Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85
(1984).

One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST.

amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have
the assistance of counsel for his defense."), which has been interpreted as the right to
the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86.

Mr. Gonzales' petition also asserted a claim concerning his counsel's failure to advise
him not to participate in the pre-sentence investigation interview; however,
Mr. Gonzales is not appealing the summary dismissal of that particular claim.

8
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There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has rendered
ineffective assistance in contravention of a criminal defendant's right to counsel. The
threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., whether it "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under prevailing
professional norms." Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient performance,
the next inquiry is whether that deficient perforrnance prejudiced the defendant Id. at
687, 691-96.

In order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's

deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcorne in the case" since the "result
of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair,
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to
have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different" Id. at 694.
Under Idaho law, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised by
the defendant in his direct appeal; however, such a claim is more appropriately asserted
through a petition for post-conviction relief. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96, 92
P.3d 542, 545-46 (Ct App. 2004).
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is separate and
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction.
Pe/tierv. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding

governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter,

UPCPA)

(I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at
456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his
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allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816,
892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition initiating a post-conviction
proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition
is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of the claim"; it "must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id.; I.C. § 194903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal."
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998).

Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there are no
genuine issues as to any material facts and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c).9 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard,
the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez,
126 Idaho at 816-17, 892 P.2d at 491-92.

However, if the petitioner presents any

evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's
allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the State.
Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if the

9 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g.,
Small, 132 Idaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155 (discussing the standard for summary
disposition under section 19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of
material fact has been presented).
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allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts
the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the evidence.
State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982).

Drapeau v.

But in doing so, it must still

liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner,
Small, 132 Idaho at 331,971 P.2d at 1155. 10

If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331,971 P.2d at 1155.
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion.

I.C. § 19-

4906(b), (c).
If the district court orders dismissal sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner
twenty days' notice and allow the petitioner to respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b).
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the
decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159-60,715 P.2d 369,
371-72 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it makes no difference whether
the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 12930,578 P.2d 244, 245-46 (1978). Moreover, vague notice of the district court's intent to
dismiss is insufficient.

.

The district court must be specific as to the bases for the

intended dismissal so as to provide the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to
respond.

Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993).

It is not

sufficient to merely recite the language from section 19-4906 and state a conclusion.

The district court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are
"clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622,
630 (Ct. App. 1996).
10
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Id. If the district court fails to give the petitioner the required notice and opportunity to
respond, or if the district court's notice is impermissibly vague, the petition must be
reinstated. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456-57,458,808 P.2d at 375-76,377 (failure to give
any notice); Banks, 123 Idaho at 954,855 P.2d at 39 (notice was impermissibly vague).
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,402-03, 128 P.3d 938, 939-40 (2006).
Applying these standards to Mr. Gonzales' case, it ought to be apparent (for the
reasons stated in detail below) that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
Mr. Gonzales' petition in its entirety.
C.

Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claims
Mr. Gonzales raised the following two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

in his petition for post-conviction relief: (1) his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek
out a private (privileged) psychosexual evaluation; and (2) his attorney was ineffective
for failing to advise him not to participate in the court-ordered (unprivileged)
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith.11 (No. 36625 R., pp.4, 7-8; see also R., pp.3233 (letter of appellate counsel).) These two interrelated claims are based on certain
fundamental principles: first, once a defendant has been found guilty of a sex offense,
competent defense counsel must not only apprise his client of his Fifth Amendment right
to silence during the pre-sentence investigation interview and psychosexual evaluation,
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but also advise his client as to whether the client should invoke/waive that right; second,
to the extent that it ever may be reasonable to advise a client to waive his Fifth
Amendment rights, competent defense counsel cannot so advise his client unless or
until he knows what information is likely to be revealed in the interview andlor
evaluation, and what kind of conclusions might result; and third, the only way for
competent counsel to gather the evidence necessary to advise his client as to whether
the client should waive his Fifth Amendment rights and participate in the pre-sentence
investigation interview and psychosexual evaluation, or to properly prepare for
sentencing generally, is to obtain an independent (privileged) evaluation prior to
sentencing. Mr. Gonzales' point, quite clearly, was that had counsel acted competently
in this regard, at a minimum, Dr. Smith's extraordinarily prejudicial report would not
have been before the district court at the time of Mr. Gonzales' sentencing hearing. 12
For the reasons set forth in detail below, Mr. Gonzales contends that he has
asserted cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and presented a prima
facie case as to each.

11 As noted, Mr. Gonzales present no claim on appeal related to the summary dismissal
of his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him not to participate in
the pre-sentence investigation interview. (See note 8, supra.)
12 Contrary to the district court's belief, Mr. Gonzales' claim is not based on any
speculation as to what may have been wrong with Dr. Smith's evaluation, or what any
other expert (such as Dr. Dodgen) would have said. Rather, as noted, Mr. Gonzales
simply asserts that, but for counsel's deficient performance, Dr. Smith's damning report
would not have been before the district court at sentencing.
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1.

Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffectiveness
Based On Counsel's Failure To Seek Out An Independent (Privileged)
Psychosexual Evaluation

As noted above, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the petitioner must prove both prongs of the Strickland standard-deficient performance
on the part of counsel, as well as some prejudice owing to that deficient performance.
At the summary dismissal stage, however, the petitioner need only present prima facie
evidence of both prongs. McKay v. State, _ Idaho _, _

P.3d _, 2010 WL 323546,

*3-4 (Jan. 29, 2010). In this case, Mr. Gonzales has easily satisfied that standard.
a)

Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Deficient
Performance

It is well-settled in Idaho that the existence and identity of defense experts, as
well as the statements, reports, and opinions of those experts, are protected unless or
until the defense decides to utilize those experts in open court. See I.C.R. 16(c) & (g);
i.R.E. 502. Accordingly, in a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of a sex
offense, there is little or no risk that a psychosexual evaluation of the defendant
performed by an independent expert retained for that purpose by the defense need end
up in the district court's hands for the defendant's sentencing hearing. If the evaluation
turns out to be favorable to the defendant, defense counsel could, and indeed should,
offer the independent expert's testimony (or a report in lieu of live testimony), in
mitigation at his client's sentencing hearing. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 39596 (2000) (trial counsel's failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating
evidence deemed to be deficient performance); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
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JUSTICE, The Defense Function §§ 4-4.1 (a)13 & 4_8.1(b)14; ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Providing

Defense

Services § 5_1.4 15 ; NLADA, PERFORMANCE

GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guidelines 4.1,16 8.1 (a), 17 8.3(a),18

13 "Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the
case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
penalty in the event of conviction. . .. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the
accused's stated desire to plead guilty." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The
Defense Function § 4-4.1 (a).
14 "Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist in reaching
a proper disposition favorable to the accused. If a presentence report or summary is
made available to defense counsel, he or she should seek to verify the information
contained in it and should be prepared to supplement or challenge it if necessary. If
there is no presentence report or if it is not disclosed, defense counsel should submit to
the court and the prosecutor all favorable information relevant to sentencing and in an
appropriate case. . .."
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense
Function § 4-8.1(b).
15 "The legal representation plan should provide for investigatory, expert, and other
services necessary to quality legal representation. These should include not only those
services and facilities needed for an effective defense at trial but also those that are
required for effective defense participation in every phase of the process." ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Providing Defense Services § 5-1.4.
16 "Counsel has a duty to conduct an independent investigation regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt. . . .
Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is necessary or appropriate
to: (A) the preparation of the defense; (B) adequate understanding of the prosecution's
case; (C) rebut the prosecution's case." NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1.
17 "Among counsel's obligations in the sentencing process are: . . . to ensure all
reasonably available mitigating and favorable information, which is likely to benefit the
client, is presented to the court," and "to consider the need for and availability of
sentencing speCialists, and to seek the assistance of such specialists whenever
possible and warranted." NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.1 (a).
18 "In preparing for sentencing, counsel should consider the need to . .. collect
documents and affidavits to support the defense position and, where relevant, prepare
witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing .... " NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.3(a).
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8.4(a),19 8.6(a),20 & 8.721 ; IDAHO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.1.22 However, if the
evaluation turns out to be unfavorable, such that it would be unhelpful (or even harmful)
to the defendant if disclosed, defense counsel could simply keep the evaluation
confidential. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,97,100-01,967 P.2d 702, 711, 714-15
(1998) (noting that privileged expert reports need not be disclosed if unfavorable to the
defendant).

In light of the tremendous potential upside to obtaining a favorable

psychosexual evaluation that can be offered in mitigation, especially where there is
virtually no downside risk of an unfavorable evaluation coming back to haunt the
defendant, there is simply no tactical reason for defense counsel not to obtain
independent psychosexual evaluations in virtually every case in which a client is
awaiting sentencing for a sex crime. 23

19 "Counsel should ... provide to the official preparing the [presentence] report relevant
information favorable to the client . . . . " NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.4(a).
20 "Counsel should prepare and present to the court a defense sentencing
memorandum where there is a strategic reason for doing so. Among the topics counsel
may wish to include in the memorandum are: ... information favorable to the defendant
concerning such matters as the offense, mitigating factors and relative culpability, prior
offenses, personal background," and "information which would support a sentencing
disposition other than incarceration, such as the potential for rehabilitation . . . ."
NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline
8.6(a).
21 "Counsel should be prepared at the sentencing proceeding to take the steps
necessary to advocate fully for the requested sentence and to protect the client's
interest. . "
Where information favorable to the defendant will be disputed or
challenged, counsel should be prepared to present supporting evidence, including
testimony of witnesses, to establish the facts favorable to the defense." NLADA,
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guidelines
8.7(a) & (d).
22 "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." I.R.P.C.1.1.
23 In the average sex crime case, the only reason to forego an independent
psychosexual evaluation might be the cost of that evaluation. Whether this reason is a
21

Moreover, without a confidential psychosexual evaluation in hand, defense
counsel can have absolutely no idea what may come out of any such evaluation,24 and
he can have no basis to intelligently advise his client to either invoke his Fifth

"strategic" reason, however, is a question that this Court need not answer in this case,
as the Record on Appeal seems to indicate that the cost of any psychosexual evaluation
was not an issue in this case, as Mr. Gonzales did, in fact, pay for a psychosexual
evaluation out of his own pocket-the extraordinarily prejudicial court-ordered
evaluation performed by Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R., p.44.)
Because this is a case with privately-retained defense counsel and a
psychosexual evaluation paid for by the defendant, this Court need not concern itself
with the conflict of interest that undeniably exists between those criminal defendants
who are represented by defenders in law firms with flat-fee public defender contracts or
in dedicated public defender offices with fixed budgets, in which cases the attorneys
have every financial incentive to push their clients to participate in the court-ordered
evaluations simply because the cost of such evaluations would be borne directly by the
government, instead of coming out of the defenders' own operating budgets (or profit
margins).
24 While it may be tempting to hold that defense counsel has a near-absolute right to
rely on the representations of his client and, therefore, cannot be found to have
rendered deficient performance by advising his client based upon those
representations, the fact is that is not necessarily true when it comes to adviSing sex
offenders about the risks of participating in a non-privileged psychosexual evaluation.
First, with regard to the concern that a psychosexual evaluation (especially one
that is coupled with a polygraph examination) may disclose additional sex crimes which
may be extremely prejudicial at sentencing, it is no solution to say that counsel can
simply ask his client if he has committed other acts of sexual misconduct which may
come to light during the evaluation process. Given the stigma attached to sex offenses,
most sex offenders tend to live in a world of denial, where they cannot admit their
actions (or their desires) even to themselves, much less to some lawyer who they hardly
know. This is especially true in cases where they are represented by lawyers appointed
by, and sometimes even employed directly by, the State.
Second, there are other risks associated with a defendant's participation in a
psychosexual evaluation besides the concern that additional crimes will be disclosed.
One such risk is that other highly prejudicial "deviant," albeit not illegal, sexual conduct
will be disclosed. Thus, even if counsel could rely on his client's representations
regarding his past criminal conduct, counsel may not know to ask the questions
necessary to gain a full understanding of what might actually come out in the
psychosexual evaluation. Another risk is that counsel does not have access to, or the
ability to interpret, the diagnostic tests utilized in a psychosexual evaluation, many of
which may give rise to expert opinions that are highly prejudicial, the most obvious of
which would be a conclusion that the client presents a high risk of re-offense and/or is
untreatable.
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Amendment rights or, instead, to participate in a court-ordered (non-privileged)
evaluation. Under these circumstances, if counsel advises his client to waive his rights
and participate in the evaluation, he turns his client's fate over to chance. This is not
effective assistance of counsel.
It is now well-recognized that counsel's decisions (even those that one might try
to characterize as "strategic decisions") are unreasonable insofar as they are based on
inadequate information, see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-29 (2003) (trial
counsel's "tactical" decision not to pursue a mitigation investigation and, instead, to
pursue an alternate strategy at sentencing, deemed to be deficient performance where
the decision to abandon the mitigation investigation was based on insufficient
information about the state of the mitigation evidence); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691
("[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.").
Thus, it ought not to be surprising that the Idaho Supreme Court has already implicitly
recognized that an attorney renders deficient performance when he allows a
psychological evaluation to be turned over to the district court and the State before the
attorney even knows what that evaluation might say. In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,
967 P.2d 702 (1998), the Supreme Court held that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object when:

(1) the district court ordered the defense expert's psychiatric

evaluation report concerning the defendant be appended to the pre-sentence
investigation report, and (2) the State called the defense's psychiatric expert to offer
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testimony in aggravation at the defendant's sentencing hearing. Critically, in discussing
the defense expert's report, the Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel rendered
deficient performance in failing to object to its inclusion in the pre-sentence investigation
report because "the [psychiatric] report had not been completed and its contents could
not be known" to counsel, id. at 97, 967 P.2d at 711, and, "[a]lthough there are
instances in which defense counsel properly would not object, knowing that contents of
the report are favorable to the defendant, in this case the report had not been written
and [counsel] did not know whether it would be favorable or unfavorable," id. at 101,
967 P.3d at 715. Thus, in Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that defense
counsel cannot make an informed decision as to whether the contents of a
psychological evaluation (of which a psychosexual evaluation is undoubtedly a
specialized form) should be disclosed to the State or the sentencing court without first
ascertaining the contents of that evaluation.
Since an independent (confidential) psychosexual evaluation could have been
potentially beneficial to Mr. Gonzales, and because there is no valid strategic or tactical
reason for defense counsel to forego such an evaluation, by presenting evidence that
his counsel failed to obtain such an evaluation, Mr. Gonzales has presented prima facie
evidence that his counsel rendered deficient performance in this case.
b)

Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Prejudice

Although Mr. Gonzales certainly cannot speculate that an independent
psychosexual evaluation would have drawn Dr. Smith's report into question or provided
significant mitigating evidence, it is nevertheless clear that counsel's approach of
foregoing an independent (privileged) evaluation in favor of the court-ordered (non-
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privileged) evaluation was extremely prejudicial under the facts of this case. Based on
the existing record, it is reasonable to infer that, had counsel obtained an independent
evaluation, any resulting report would have turned out to be just as unflattering as the
report prepared by Dr. Smith and, therefore, competent counsel would have kept that
report confidential and advised his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights during the
court-ordered evaluation. Thus, neither Dr. Smith's extremely prejudicial report (see
generally PSE (revealing additional crimes and victims, a pattern of abuse, minimization

and a lack of empathy on Mr. Gonzales' part and a moderate risk of re-offense);
Polygraph Report), nor any similar report, would have been considered by the district
court at sentencing. And, as noted above, the district court clearly relied quite heavily
on Dr. Smith's very damaging report. (See No, 36625 R., p.47; see, e.g., No. 35211
Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.7-9, p.16, L.20 - p.18, L.10.)
The fact that the district court has stated, after the fact, that it would have
imposed the same sentence upon Mr. Gonzales, even absent the damning PSE by
Dr. Smith, is of no consequence to the prejudice analysis in the present case. The
United States Supreme Court made it clear in Strickland that, in order to establish 25
"prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not
altered the outcome in the case" since the "result of a proceeding can be rendered
unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94.

Instead, it need only be shown "that there is a

25 This Court must keep in mind that, at the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Gonzales
was not required to establish, i.e., prove, anything; his only responsibility was to present
prima facie evidence.
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Clearly, this standard leaves no
room for the subjective, post hoc rationalizations of the sentencing judge. Indeed, as
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ably explained:

A trial judge's post-hoc statements conceming how additional evidence
might have affected its ruling are not determinative for purposes of
assessing prejudice. Indeed, in Strickland, the trial judge who sentenced
the petitioner to death testified during federal habeas proceedings that the
additional evidence would not have caused him to rule differently. See
[Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.] at 678-79, 104 S.Ct. at 2060;
Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir.1982). The
Supreme Court held that this testimony was "irrelevant to the prejudice
inquiry." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. The Court made
clear that the assessment should be based on an objective standard that
presumes a reasonable decisionmaker. Id. at 695, 104 S.C!. at 2068.
Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008).26

In light of the Strickland standard, it ought not to be surprising that, in Estrada v.
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a

showing that a damaging psychosexual evaluation (placed before the court due to the
deficient performance of counsel) "play[ed] an important role in the sentencing," is
sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. Assuming then that
Strickland and Estrada still control,27 it is readily apparent that Mr. Gonzales has at least

26 Furthermore, to the extent that the sentencing judge's subjective, after-the-fact
explanation of what sentence he would have handed down under an alternate set of
facts might be relevant, his explanation is not a question of law which could be resolved
through summary disposition proceedings; his testimony creates a question of fact,
which could only be resolved at a contested evidentiary hearing.
27 Mr. Gonzales is not unmindful of the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Hughes v.
State, 138 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case, despite the plain
language of Estrada, the Court of Appeals rejected the notion "that the Estrada
Court ... [held] that the level of the sentencing court's reliance on the PSE was the only
factor in analyzing prejudice," Hughes, 148 Idaho at 464, 224 P.3d at 531, and it went
on to create a new three-part test, which took into account: (1) the degree to which the
psychosexual evaluation was materially unfavorable, (2) the degree to which the
26

made out a prima facie case of prejudice since:

the district court specifically

acknowledged its heavy reliance on the PSE (both at the time of sentencing (see, e.g.,
No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.20-21, p.17, Ls.1-3) and in dismissing Mr. Gonzales' postconviction petition (see No. 36625 R., p,47)); it made specific, repeated references to
Dr. Smith's report in imposing sentence (see, e.g., No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.21-25,
p.10, Ls.10-19); and, viewing the district court's sentencing comments as a whole, it

sentencing court relied upon the evaluation, and (3) the totality of the evidence before
the sentencing court, id. at 464-65, 531-32. Despite the Court of Appeals' claim that the
third factor in its new test "does not shift [its] analysis to a determination of whether the
sentence imposed is supported by the evidence," and, instead, merely calls for a
determination of "whether it can be said, considering all of the evidence before the
sentencing court, that there is a reasonable probability that the PSE resulted in a
greater sentence," id. at 465, 224 P.3d 532, the Court of Appeals appears to have gone
on to do precisely that, see id. at 465-69, 224 P.3d at 532-36. Although the Court of
Appeals recognized that the psychosexual evaluation was very unfavorable to the
petitioner, and that it had been relied upon by the sentencing court, it highlighted the
fact that the sentencing judge had discussed the petitioner's crimes and had opined that
those crimes showed that the petitioner was "evil," and it offered the following
conclusory statement related to its weighing of the evidence:
We have considered the extent and character of any admissions by
Hughes and conclusions based thereon in the PSE, the extent· of the
sentencing court's reliance on the PSE which can be demonstrated from
the record, and the totality of the evidence before the sentencing court.
From this review, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the PSE, Hughes would have received a more favorable sentence.
Hughes has failed to demonstrate prejudice in satisfaction of the second
prong of the Strickland standard. Therefore, the district court's dismissal
of Hughes' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure
to advise Hughes regarding his rights prior to the PSE is affirmed.
Hughes, 148 Idaho at 468-69,224 P.2d at 535-36.
To the extent that Hughes created a prejudice standard that is inconsistent with
Strickland and Estrada (and Mr. Gonzales contends that it does because, the Court of
Appeals' claims notwithstanding, it really just calls for the Court of Appeals to render a
decision based on its own subjective belief as to what the petitioner's sentence should
have been), it has no precedential value and ought not to be followed in this case.
However, to the extent that the new Hughes standard has any ongoing vitality,
Mr. Gonzales has satisfied that standard since, as noted above, the PSE in his case
was extremely unfavorable, the district court relied almost exclusively on that PSE, and
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appears that Dr. Smith's report was the single biggest factor underlying the prison
sentence ultimately imposed (see No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.19, L.4).
Thus, on the record that exists in this case, it is apparent that Mr. Gonzales has
presented, at the very least, a prima facie case of prejudice in support of his claim that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney's failure to obtain an
independent psychosexual evaluation.
2.

Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Of Ineffectiveness Based On
Counsel's Failure To Advise Him Not To Participate In The Pre-Sentence
Investigation Interview Or The Court-Ordered (Unprivileged) Psychosexual
Evaluation With Dr. Smith

As noted, in order to survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must present prima facie evidence of the
deficient performance of defense counsel, as well as some prejudice owing to that
deficient performance. McKay v. State, _Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2010 WL 323546, *3-4
(Jan. 29, 2010). Just as he satisfied this standard with regard to his claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent (confidential) psychosexual
evaluation, so too has he satisfied this standard with regard to his claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to advise him to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and not
participate in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith.
a)

Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Deficient
Performance

In Estrada, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that:

a psychosexual

evaluation is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, such that the defendant has a

there can be little doubt that Dr. Smith's observations and opinions led to a longer
sentence than would otherwise have been imposed.

28

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during that stage of the
proceeding, Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561-63, 149 P.3d at 836-38; the defendant has a
Fifth Amendment right to silence during a psychosexual evaluation, id. at 563-64, 140
P.3d at 838-39; and the failure of counsel to advise the defendant of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence and advise him as to whether he should waive that right and
submit to the psychosexual evaluation may constitute deficient performance and

ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 562-63, 564, 149 P.3d at 837-38, 839. On the
latter point, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that "a defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel regarding ... the decision of whether to submit to a
psychosexual exam. . .. Estrada does have a right to at least the advice of counsel
regarding his participation in the psychosexual evaluation .... " Id. at 562-63, 837-38.
Thus, it is clear that effective assistance of counsel not only includes informing the
defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to silence during his psychosexual evaluation,
but also competent advice as to whether he should invoke that right.

Id.

Cf., e.g.,

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966) (recognizing that even after one has

been advised of his right to silence, he still may benefit from the guiding hand of
counsel); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (holding that a criminal
defendant is not only entitled to know what her plea choices are, but also advice from
her counsel concerning what plea should actually be entered).
As discussed above, the uncontroverted evidence in this case is that
Mr. Gonzales' counsel never obtained an independent psychosexual evaluation for his

client (No. 36625 R., p.8) and, thus, the most reasonable inference is that he could not
have known what kind of damaging evidence might come out of his client's participation
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in the court-ordered (unprivileged) evaluation with Dr. Smith.

Nevertheless, counsel

failed to advise his client not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. (No. 36625
R, p.8.)
While it is difficult to imagine any situation in which it would be reasonable for a
defense attorney, ignorant of the likely outcome of a court-ordered (unprivileged)
psychosexual evaluation, to fail to advise his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment
rights, such a failure is particularly egregious in a case such as this one-where
defense counsel had reason to believe that the court-ordered evaluation would disclose
aggravating evidence.

In this case, although Mr. Gonzales had only originally been

charged with two counts of lewd conduct (for manual-to-genital contact and oral-togenital contact) over a relatively brief period of time (four months) (No. 35211 R, ppA5), and had pled guilty to only one of those two counts-the one that was arguably less
egregious (the instance of manual-to-genital contact) (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.13, L.15p.14, L.5), and although, on the single count of rape, Mr. Gonzales had been bound
over on the lesser offense of attempted rape (see No. 35211 R, p.30), the fact is that
there was some reason to believe that Mr. Gonzales had engaged in a pattern of sexual
abuse of his daughter, and that the sexual contact was more egregious than
Mr. Gonzales had pled guilty to.

Specifically, counsel had information indicating that

Mr. Gonzales' daughter had said that she had been sexually abused virtually every
night for a period of time, this sexual abuse included multiple instances of vaginal
intercourse, and she perceived a threat of physical abuse if she attempted to resist her
father's advances.

(See No. 35211 R, p.? (affidavit in support of complaint,

summarizing CARES interview with victim).) Counsel should have known that, if the
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daughter's claims were true, there was a good chance that fact would come out in the
court-ordered

psychosexual

evaluation

(especially

if it

included

a polygraph

examination, as most psychosexual evaluations do) and that Mr. Gonzales might be
made to appear as if he was wrongfully denying or minimizing his conduct, or was
failing to show remorse for his actions. In light of all of this, and in light of the fact that
counsel did not have an independent (confidential) evaluation to work from, counsel
never should have "rolled the dice" by failing to advise his client to invoke his right to
silence during the court-ordered evaluation.

In short, counsel rendered deficient

performance when he failed to advise Mr. Gonzales not to participate in the courtordered evaluation with Dr. Smith.
b)

Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Prejudice

Had counsel correctly advised Mr. Gonzales to invoke his Fifth Amendment
rights and not participate in the court-ordered (non-privileged) evaluation, Mr. Gonzales
presumably would have followed that advice (see No. 36625 R., pp.7-8) and Dr. Smith's
extremely prejudicial evaluation would not have been considered by the district court at
sentencing.
As discussed in Part I(C)(1)(b) above (and, therefore, not repeated in full herein),
because the district court specifically acknowledged its heavy reliance on the PSE; it
made specific, repeated references to Dr. Smith's report in imposing sentence; and,
viewing the district court's sentencing comments as a whole, it appears that Dr. Smith's
report was the single biggest factor underlying the prison sentence ultimately imposed,
it is clear that Dr. Smith's report played a role in Mr. Gonzales' sentence. Therefore,
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Mr. Gonzales has met his burden of presenting prima facie evidence of prejudice owing
to his counsel's failure to advise him not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation.
II.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gonzales' Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
Because, At a Minimum, Mr. Gonzales Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is
governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 'may be
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2004).
In Charboneau, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the postconviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,679,23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001)). It further held
that the proceeding is not frivolous and, thus, counsel must be appointed, if the
petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim .... " Id. at 793, 102 P.3d
at 1112 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), the
Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in postconviction cases. In that case, the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau standard:
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
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counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,
679,23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), the court should appoint counsel if the facts
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim.

Swader, 143 Idaho at 654, 152 P.3d at 15. The Swader Court also made it clear that
this standard is much lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction
relief on their merits because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se
petitioners generally cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of
whether those claims will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 654-55, 152 P.3d 15-16.

In light of the foregoing standards, Mr. Gonzales contends that, even if his
verified petition for post-conviction relief, when considered along with his supporting
affidavit and his supplemental filing, failed to present prima facie evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel so as to survive summary dismissal, based on the reasoning set
forth in Part I, above (which is incorporated herein by this reference), they are sufficient
to meet the standard for appointment of counsel, i.e., they raise the possibility of a valid
claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Gonzales respectfully requests that the district
court's summary dismissal order be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing or, at the very least, for appointment of counsel.

DATED thi''''' day of Apeil, 2010.
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